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A new method for analysis of text-based reports in accident coding is suggested. This approach utilizes
latent semantic analysis to infer higher-order structures between documents and provide an unbiased
metric to the narrative analysis process. Results from this study on a small sample of aviation safety
narratives demonstrates an unsupervised categorization accuracy of 44% for primary-cause within the
existing taxonomy. If provided with a large sample set, the indication is that a signiﬁcant increase in
accuracy is possible along with the possibility of recoding between data sets. Demonstrated is the ability
of LSA to capture contextual proximity of a narrative.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Place yourself in the role of a safety manager, who is account-
able for identifying and managing safety trends within your orga-
nization. A central element in assessing your organization’s current
safety climate and identifying safety trends involves making sense
of voluntarily submitted safety reports. Several questions evolve
for a safety manager attempting to make sense of a submitted
report: ‘‘Is this incident of concern?’’ ‘‘Are other similar events hap-
pening within the organization?’’ ‘‘Does this report signify a
trend?’’ ‘‘Is this an area of signiﬁcant concern?’’ ‘‘What actions
are appropriate to manage or mitigate this threat?’’ ‘‘What are
the risks to the organization?’’ Central to answering these ques-
tions is the ability to efﬁciently identify reports of a similar nature
within the organization and industry. Imagine having received the
following narrative report.
‘‘After arrival at gate, the Flight Attendant disarmed door 2R and
then proceeded to door 2L where he began opening the door
without disarming it. Realizing his mistake, he attempted to
disarm the door, but the gate agent outside the door began
trying to open the door resisting the ﬂight attendants attempt
to close and disarm the door. The slide pack fell onto the cabin
ﬂoor but did not inﬂate. Company personnel were summonedand took control of the situation. As Captain, I was still in the
cockpit ﬁnishing the last of my cleanup procedures and was
unaware of the events as no one notiﬁed me. I became aware
of the situation only when going to the door 2L area where I
became aware of what was going on.’’ (ACN Report Number
839745, Primary Problem: Human Factors).
A safety professional, when confronted with a report narrative,
engages in a process of sensemaking, parallel to that as described
by Weick et al. (2005). Sensemaking ultimately answers the ques-
tion of ‘‘what does an event mean?’’ (Weick et al., 2005, p. 410).
Voluntary safety narrative reports play a role in the sense making
process by providing a mechanism for collecting data that leads
safety professionals to identify problem areas and discover mean-
ingful trends. Coding taxonomies and text based searches provide
safety managers with a tool for searching safety narrative
databases for similar reports, useful in the sensemaking process.
Machine learning techniques such as latent semantic analysis
(LSA) provide an additional technique for safety managers engaged
in sensemaking.
LSA aids the safety professional in understanding the meaning
or signiﬁcance of narrative reports, by relating them to other orga-
nizational events. This parallels the sensemaking steps of selection
and retention described by Weick et al. (2005). LSA uses a different
method from that provided by coding taxonomies to identify
similar narrative reports. LSA has the potential to provide greater
ﬂexibility and to be more adaptive than traditional taxonomies.
LSA matching provides an automated computer process for
identifying similar report narratives that is less subject to
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effort.
To provide an illustration, consider the aforementioned volun-
tarily submitted report narrative. The LSA process allows the safety
practitioner to generate a list of report narratives both within and
external to their safety reporting system. In this case, the submit-
ted report was compared using LSA with a sample database gener-
ated from the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). Using a
predetermined threshold (cosine <0.50), 37 report narratives of a
similar nature were identiﬁed. In contrast to a taxonomical search,
which relies on a coding structure, these reports were heuristically
generated strictly based on textual similarity. To illustrate a limita-
tion of the ASRS taxonomy, these reports were coded by ASRS
experts with a range of primary problems, including Aircraft (17),
Human Factors (11), Ambiguous (8), and MEL (1). The narrative
reports that follow indicate the closest narratives to our exemplar,
as contained in our ASRS sample dataset, from the primary prob-
lem categories of Aircraft, Human Factors, and Ambiguous.
The nearest report coded with a primary problem of Ambiguous
is as follows:
Ready for pushback, Flight Attendant from door 2L came to
cockpit to indicate that door 2L was not arming properly, that
the wedge was not coming out. [I] went to door 2L to investi-
gate. Looking at door, moved lever to disarm and looked again.
Opened door handle and it was apparent that door was not dis-
armed, door with assist opened partially. Slide was attached at
bottom and partly out of pack. I tried to close door but slide
then deployed. No one was hurt; no one else was involved in
manipulating the door. Maintenance was called and it was
determined that the slide would be replaced and ﬂight to oper-
ate with a delay. (ACN 1031966, LSA cosine 0.861).
The nearest report coded with a Primary Problem of Human
Factors is as follows:
I was the ‘A’ Flight Attendant and was feeling nauseous and
dizzy during descent. When I reached down to disarm the L1
door I must have disengaged the girt bar and instead of attach-
ing it above to disarm, I rearmed it. I attempted to open L1 door
along with the Agent, when I realized the door was still armed.
We closed and I disarmed the door, but the slide pack had
dropped into a position that prevented us from opening the
door. Maintenance had to be called to remove the slide pack.
We deplaned. I believe that I am experiencing symptoms of a
sinus infection. The dizzy, nauseous sensations I was having
contributed to a potentially deadly mistake. Even though I cross
checked myself, had the red ﬂag up, and made my announce-
ment I will always be conscious of how the door feels and aware
of the dragging sound the slide makes when the door has not
been disarmed and you attempt to open it. That ﬁnal awareness
saved me from one of my worst fears. (ACN 983720, LSA cosine
0.836).
The nearest report coded with a Primary Problem of Aircraft is
as follows:
This was a charter ﬂight. The aircraft was parked in the north
lot. Airstairs were brought to the aircraft door at 1L. It appeared
the person trying to open the door was having difﬁculty open-
ing the door. I cracked the door. He still appeared to be having
difﬁculty, so I gave the door a push. The person on the other side
was still having difﬁculty opening the door. I soon saw why. The
side of the slide pan was caught on the side of the aircraft door.
As the person on the outside continued to pull the door open
the slide pan opened and the slide fell out, but did not deploy.
A Mechanic arrived to detach the slide from the door. He said
the door was armed. The arming mechanismwas stuck betweenarm and disarm and we were unable to put it in either the arm
or the disarm position. I told him that I disarmed the door. After
I disarmed it, I made the all call to disarm cross check and stand
by for all call. . .It is possible the next time a slide may in fact
deploy. (ACN 969496, LSA cosine 0.832).The similarity between the above reports should be self evident,
despite differences in the primary problem coding. In each case, an
inadvertent deployment of an exit slide was a possibility, as evi-
denced by the actual deployment in one case, and the reporter
expressed concerns of a possible deployment in the other cases.
In this case, use of the LSA process utilizing only the raw report
narrative generated a list of 37 reports many of which are useful
in the sense making process. These reports covered a range of pri-
mary problems and contributing factors. Of those reports, 16
reports dealt speciﬁcally with the improper arming or disarming
of exit slides (including inadvertent deployments). 20 of the
reports were related to improper door operation. The ﬁnal report
involved a damaged cockpit door.
In contrast, a similar search of the same database using multiple
text strings was conducted. These search strings included ‘‘inad-
vertent slide deployment’’, ‘‘door AND disarm AND ﬂight atten-
dant’’, and ‘‘door slide OR exit slide OR inadvertent deployment
OR improperly armed OR improperly disarmed’’. In total, the text
based searches captured 11 of the LSA generated report narratives,
of which seven related to inadvertent slide deployments. The LSA
process generated 13 reports beyond that of our simpliﬁed text
search. Anecdotally this indicates that the LSA process provides
safety managers with an additional tool beyond coding taxonomies
and text searches for identifying similar report narratives within
large databases. The reliance of LSA on raw report narratives avoids
the time and effort required to code incoming reports, overcomes
the limitations of existing taxonomies, and provides additional
ﬂexibility in generating safety reports across databases.
1.1. Latent semantic analysis
The methodology of latent semantic analysis (LSA), developed
by Deerwester et al. (1990), has seen many applications since ori-
ginal publication. The process has subsequently been applied to
diverse ﬁelds of inquiry, from educational theory (Landauer and
Dumais, 1997) to automated document classiﬁcation (Liu et al.,
2004; Landauer et al., 1998; Zukas and Price, 2003). Thus far, tex-
tual analysis techniques such as LSA have not been widely applied
within the ﬁeld of safety management, despite the abundance of
narratives alongside other quantitative data. In aviation, accident
analysis narratives are commonly used to manually discriminate
factors developed through traditional statistical methods applied
to quantitative data.
LSA is a mathematical technique for inferring relations between
words within bodies of text. Without the assumptions of other lan-
guage processing methods, LSA extracts the occurrence of words in
a text body and creates a term frequency document matrix. A sin-
gular value decomposition (SVD) is applied to the resulting matrix.
The central matrix from the SVD is then truncated by the substitu-
tion of the lowest values with zero. This truncated, or reduced
space, form of the matrix then provides the inferred relationships
between terms used in similar contexts. In this reduced space,
term associations are made that are not present in any single body
of text. Thus latent relationships are revealed by this method.
This application of LSA has been successfully used to match
similar texts, answer multi-choice based subject tests, and predict
subjective ratings of texts. Studies of document classiﬁcation prob-
lems have indicated that accuracies up to 93% (Huang, 2003) are
possible when LSA is combined with support vector machines
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to 90% for unsupervised LSA alone in predicting the grades
assigned by human reviewers to individual text submissions.
1.2. Background
Historically, narrative reports have relied on coding taxonomies
to facilitate classiﬁcation of safety reports (see Bailey, 1989), to
provide access to narrative databases (Wallace and Ross, 2004),
and to allow quantitative assessment of safety reporting (Bailey,
1989). Taxonomies are useful in managing large volumes of data
(Hawkins et al., 2003), providing order to complex systems
(Nickerson et al., 2009), allowing for classiﬁcation and quantiﬁca-
tion of safety reports, and for identifying patterns of similarity
(Nickerson et al., 2009) or variation (Wallace and Ross, 2004). Tax-
onomies are also useful in describing and explaining safety related
behaviors (Perry, 1989). At the theoretical level, the development
of taxonomies provides a means for holistically studying particular
objects of study (Bailey, 1989) while facilitating hypothesis testing
of relationships among objects (Nickerson et al., 2009).
While taxonomies have proven useful in safety science, the use
of taxonomies is not without limitation. The process of coding
narrative reports into the taxonomy structure is cost and labor
intensive (Hawkins et al., 2003), provides inconsistent and/or unreli-
able results (Wallace and Ross, 2004), and results in the loss of
information as data is reduced into limited categories (Taib et al.,
2011). Taxonomies function by forcing narrative reports into dis-
crete groups with limited categories, which ﬁlter and reduce infor-
mation available to facilitate comparison or classiﬁcation (Taib
et al., 2011). The structure of the taxonomy decides what is rele-
vant by focusing on particular elements of the data that are prede-
termined, rather than summarizing or representing the data for
meaning and implications (Wallace and Ross, 2004). By forcing
data into limited, discrete groups there is the danger that sig-
niﬁcant information may be lost as narrow incident classiﬁcations
(such as food borne illness) may be lost in the coding taxonomy,
while larger groups (such as human factors or miscellaneous)
become overpopulated (Wallace and Ross, 2004). Incomplete or
over-generalized taxonomies result in a limited understanding of
the incident and limit the recommendations that may be made
(Taib et al., 2011). Hierarchical taxonomies may lead to a ‘‘stop
rule’’ problem, where the end of the taxonomy may obscure or
not fully describe the error (Hollnagel and Amalberti, 2001).
Taxonomies are further limited by their static nature and lack of
ﬂexibility. Once the taxonomy has been developed, it is time and
labor intensive to recode previously coded reports to reﬂect the
new coding system. Taxonomies need reevaluation as time, con-
text, and understanding change (Wallace and Ross, 2004;
Nickerson et al., 2009), many times having evolved in an ad hoc
manner (Wallace and Ross, 2004). Since sensemaking is time and
context dependent (Dervin, 1998), taxonomies are context speciﬁc
(Wallace and Ross, 2004) with their usefulness being tied to the
needs of the user (Nickerson et al., 2009; Hawkins et al., 2003;
Turner, 1989), the nature of the problem being analyzed (Drabek,
1989), and situation or culture being studied (Wallace and Ross,
2004). Taxonomies are theory dependent, evolving over time as
theory evolves (Turner, 1989). They may also be speciﬁc to the
industry or system being classiﬁed (Wallace and Ross, 2004). Dif-
ferences between competing taxonomies, using different coding
taxonomies, limit the ability to manage or compare data across
datasets. In some cases, taxonomies may fail to keep up with
changes in the needs and knowledge of the organization.
The subjective nature of human coding further limits the use-
fulness of taxonomies. Typically a reliability rating of 70% is con-
sidered good for human coding systems (Wallace and Ross, 2004;
Taib et al., 2012). The subjectivity of classiﬁcation leads tounreliability in the absence of clear objective criteria for classiﬁca-
tion, overlapping characteristics (or applicability to multiple cate-
gories) (Smith, 2002), the polysemous nature (multiple meanings)
of words, and the subjectivity of coders in deciding what is sig-
niﬁcant within the narrative (Wallace and Ross, 2004). Taxonomies
as socially constructed objects which require a degree of consensus
and compromise in establishing terms and meanings (Bailey, 1989;
Quarantelli, 1988; Turner, 1989; Wallace and Ross, 2004). The nat-
ure of error (establishing correct or incorrect behavior) implies
existing consensus about knowledge and theory, which may not
exist (Hollnagel and Amalberti, 2001; Dekker, 2004).
The abstract nature of many aviation safety coding terms adds
difﬁculty to the coding process. Dekker and Hollnagel (2004)
addresses the dangers associated with mistaking human factors
labels with the deeper insights they represent. When terms such
as situational awareness, automation complacency, and loss of
effective crew resource management are used, people ‘‘tacitly
assume that others understand the concepts named by the labels
in the same way’’ (Dekker and Hollnagel, 2004, p. 79). In similar
fashion, when determining the primary-cause for an accident nar-
rative, some discrepancy in interpretation may exist between cate-
gories such as ‘‘human factors’’ and ‘‘procedural errors’’. In utilizing
a different approach to managing safety related narratives, LSA
offers potential beneﬁts to aviation safety managers.
The LSA process is not, however, without limitation. First, it
does not account for the knowledge and experience of the safety
professional in analyzing reports for similarity (see Wallace and
Ross, 2004). The LSA process also requires an exemplar report, vec-
tor angle, or group of LSA speciﬁc themes to begin searching for
similar events. LSA is limited in inferring the intentions of actors,
given that it relies on the terminology contained in reports rather
than implied meanings. LSA while useful for comparison across
databases and coding taxonomies, is bounded when crossing
industries and cultures. Differences in terminology may impact
the usefulness and reliability of LSA across these different datasets.
A good example would be when crossing between medical and
aviation reporting systems.
In summary, LSA is an alternative technique that has the poten-
tial to overcome many of the limitations inherent in coding tax-
onomies. Instead of relying on a front-end data coding process
(pre-analysis), LSA uses a back-end process to manage, organize,
and analyze narrative data. Back-end analysis of the narratives
has several advantages over traditional coding by taxonomy. By
relying on the analog narrative report, instead of a digitally
reduced code, the majority of report information is retained for
comparison and analysis. The observable features (actions and out-
comes), along with contextual factors and conditions are retained
for analysis (Taib et al., 2011; Rasmussen and Vicente, 1989). By
avoiding the need to categorize reports into discrete, mutually
exclusive categories, reports of a similar nature that previously
might have been coded differently are linked for analysis. The
use of LSA further avoids the subjectivity of the coding process,
relying on the raw narrative rather than a subjective, interpretive
classiﬁcation into a coding taxonomy, thereby improving reliability
and consistency. Through a process of theoretical sampling, exem-
plar reports that typify a current problem or event may be used to
generate a group of similar narrative reports. This capacity expands
the usefulness of LSA by allowing the comparison of narrative
reports across databases that use different coding taxonomies.2. Theory
Through the initial preparation process the corpus is converted
to a rectangular document-term frequency matrix. Subsequently
through single value decomposition, the matrix is decomposed
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(1) represents this process.1 Columns of the U matrix are mutually
orthogonal vectors of length equal to the dictionary length. Similarly,
VT describes orthogonal vectors equal to the document number. The
r matrix is diagonal and scales the relationship between the other
matrices to reconstruct the Xmatrix. The columns of Umay be inter-
preted as topics within the subspace of the SVD since they indicate
terms that commonly occur together. The ﬁrst four of these topics
is shown in Appendix B. Since r scales the relationship, the best
approximation to the original matrix in a reduced space (of rank
j) is found by maintaining the j largest entries and setting all other
entries to zero. This constitutes a least-squares approximation of the
matrix to j dimensions. The total energy retained, or degree of ﬁt, of
the reduced space model is calculated as the sum of squares of the sin-
gular values found in the r matrix (shown by Eq. (3)). The proportion
of total energy retained by the model is then the ratio Ej=E. Normal
values fall between 80% and 95% for most LSA applications.
Within the LSA model documents are constructed as vectors
with each word in the dictionary representing a dimension. Thus
documents are compared for their similarity in vector form within
the reduced space. Two methods of comparing the document vec-
tors are commonly used in natural language programming.
Through these methods document similarity is calculated.
The most frequently used method of determining document
similarity is by use of the unit vector dot product. The unit vector
dot product, or cosine, measures the projection between vectors in
a multi-dimensional space. The calculation of cosine similarity
between two documents vectors (x and y) is shown by Eq. (4).
The cosine value is taken to represent the similarity between docu-
ments. This cosine value may fall between 1 and 1. Where the
value is closer to unity, documents are very similar. Where the
cosine value approaches zero, documents share no similarities.
Alternatively the document vectors may also be compared by mea-
surement of the absolute distance between them (euclidean dis-
tance). Unlike the cosine, the euclidean distance is not scaled and
may take on any positive value. With this approach, documents
are considered to be of greater similarity with smaller values.
These approaches differ signiﬁcantly when provided with two
very semantically similar documents of different length. The
similarity of words used will produce a cosine value inferring simi-
larity, while the increase in frequency of words within one docu-
ment will cause the euclidean distance between documents to
increase. Hence in this case of semantically similar documents,
the value returned by the cosine method will infer similarity, while
the euclidean distance returned value would infer that the docu-
ments are dissimilar.
X ¼ UrVT ð1Þ
X0 ¼ UrjVT ð2Þ
Ej ¼
Xj
i¼1
r2ii ð3Þ
Cosine ¼ x
Ty
kxkkyk ð4Þ3. Method
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the effectiveness of
LSA techniques as a contextual and thematic evaluation tool for1 For an extensive discussion on singular value decomposition please see Henry
and Hofrichter (2010).aviation safety report narratives. Speciﬁcally four research ques-
tions were presented:
 Does the use of LSA techniques reliably identify report narra-
tives of similar themes or context?
 Can thematic similarity be used to predict causal similarity?
 What cosine values provide an appropriate threshold for identi-
fying thematic or contextual similarities between report
narratives?
 Does the use of LSA techniques provide an additional tool that
may be reliably utilized in analyzing narratives?
A review of the literature failed to indicate any similar applica-
tions of LSA technology or speciﬁc methodologies for evaluating
the LSA process as a tool for safety report analysis. In the absence
of veriﬁable techniques for evaluating the application of LSA to
safety reporting a three step evaluation process was chosen. First,
in order to evaluate the strength of LSA techniques to reliably iden-
tify similarities between report narratives and to establish thresh-
old values for report analysis, two narrative data sets were
compared. One was derived from a query to the ASRS database
(query corpus), the other consisted of narratives made up of
random words generated from the aforementioned query corpus
(random corpus). Secondly, to assess the viability of LSA tech-
niques in automatic primary-cause coding of narratives, a compar-
ison of LSA cosine values for nearest neighbor reports to ASRS
primary-cause data was conducted. The percentage of nearest
neighbor reports with matching primary-causes was determined.
Thirdly, in order to further assess the usefulness of the LSA process
in analyzing safety report narratives, a review was conducted of
report narratives from the training corpus with cosine values
above 0.80 and disagreeing primary-causes. The qualitative review
of the reports identiﬁed was conducted by the researchers inde-
pendently to ensure an unbiased assessment. The LSA process
and each of these three methods will be addressed in more detail.
Data for the three test corpuses was taken from the ASRS
repository and was limited to reports that were operated under
Federal Aviation Regulation Part 121 and passenger carrying
operations. This control had the effect of focusing the reporter type
to that of professional pilots, the largest single demographic found
within ASRS.
Data from January 2011 to January 2013, which consisted of
4497 reports after ﬁltering for the given criteria, was utilized to
create a primary training corpus for the LSA. A second sample
was taken from the ASRS database to generate a query corpus, used
as a means of cross-validation. This query corpus was ﬁltered in
the same manner as the training corpus from the date range
January 2009 to December 2009 and consisted of 2987 reports. A
third test corpus was generated from the query corpus by generat-
ing a sequence of report narratives consisting of randomly assigned
words from the query corpus restructured into random word
narratives of the same length as those in the query corpus. This
random corpus was generated by random selection, without
replacement, of words from a collection of all words found in the
query corpus. The choice to select without replacement was made
such that order, or algorithmic information content, amongst docu-
ments would be lost whilst overall content remained. The corpus
was then delineated into documents of the same size as the query
corpus suitable for LSA comparison to the training corpus. By gen-
erating a random corpus for LSA analysis a baseline measure of
query corpus order and threshold cosine values could be
developed. In the case of the training and query corpuses, prima-
ry-causes of each event were extracted from the ASRS database
along with the narratives before processing.
In order to facilitate the LSA process, documents were taken
through an automated cleaning process involving computer code
Fig. 1. Values of the diagonal r matrix in rank order.
Fig. 2. Histogram of document proximity cosine values for all documents within
the training corpus when subjected to documents from the query corpus and the
random corpus.
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tionary was then created from all documents in the training cor-
pus. Stop words, such as ‘the’ and ‘a’, were removed from the
dictionary if present in a list of 402 English words shown in Appen-
dix C. Subsequently, words occurring less than 20 times were
removed to ensure SVD stability for the small corpus size. This
resulted in a dictionary of 2764 words. Each document was then
converted into a document vector to construct a corpus matrix.
The resulting corpus matrix was transformed by the term frequen-
cy inverse document frequency (TFIDF) approach of Salton and
Buckley (1988). Thus words that occur less frequently in the corpus
were deemed to be more important and assigned a higher value. A
single value decomposition (SVD) was then performed utilizing the
gensim software developed by Rˇehu˚rˇek et al. (2010). From the SVD,
the upper 400 values were retained by removal of the lower values
in the central matrix of the SVD. The choice of 400 semantic topics
was selected by a heuristic process maximizing primary cause
accuracy. In post hoc analysis, this decision was validated by a pro-
cess which the authors believe to be new to the literature. This
choice of topics to retain, resulted in a loss of 9.1% of the energy
spectrum.
Utilizing LSA, post construct of the SVD, the queries were com-
pared to the training corpus. Queries were compared with each of
the documents in the training corpus by taking the vector dot pro-
duct (cosine value) and placed in decreasing rank order. The prima-
ry-cause from the highest ranked document was returned as the
probable primary-cause of the query document. This process
resulted in the dichotomous outcome of cause match (where zero
indicated that the documents did match) and the continuous pre-
dictor of cosine value.
The potential of the LSA cosine value as a measure of narrative
context and themes was conducted by comparing the distributions
of cosine values for the query and random corpuses considered
against all reports and then to only nearest neighbors in the train-
ing corpus. From the literature review, no methodology was found
to quantitatively determine the strength of the training corpus in
capturing the contextual signiﬁcance of the query. Therefore when
providing a query to the training corpus, the concept of minimum
value for signiﬁcance or goodness of ﬁt was absent. A rational
approach to develop an internally consistent metric of signiﬁcance
was needed. The decision was made to compare the results of the
nearest neighbor cosines for the random corpus against the query
corpus. Where documents are similar, cosine values will be higher.
Therefore in the case of a large training corpus a query is likely to
return a higher cosine, since a similar document is more probable
to exist. In the case of a corpus with well deﬁned context, a higher
cosine should be returned even with a smaller training corpus. In
either case, the strength of the training corpus may be assessed
graphically by viewing the separation between the random and
query corpus or numerically by percentile scores. In the absence
of more evidence, the cosine value of the 99th percentile of the
random corpus nearest neighbor distribution was chosen as the
minimum value for contextual signiﬁcance. Where the cosine val-
ue associated with this percentile coincided with that of the query
corpus nearest neighbor distribution was taken to be a measure of
the strength for the training corpus.
The effectiveness of LSA primary-cause matching was evaluated
by creation of a randomized primary-cause sample for comparison.
For each primary-cause from the query corpus, comparison was
made with a random, with replacement, selection of primary-cause
from the training corpus. This resulted in a mean value of cause
matching accuracy across the population.
In the assessment of the usefulness of LSA to the practitioner in
analyzing narratives, a sample of high similarity reports with dif-
ferent primary-cause assignments was selected. A lower threshold
of 0.80 was chosen for the cosine. This was considered a high valuefollowing a cursory review of reports and their nearest neighbors.
In addition, this limit reduced the narrative pairs of interest to 64,
which was considered by the researchers to be of manageable size.
A selection of those reports which were considered of particular
interest are presented in Appendix A.4. Results
The central SVD (sigma) matrix reduction to 400 non-zero
terms resulted in a reduction of the energy spectrum of 9.1%. The
400 values retained plotted by rank order are show by Fig. 1.
For validation of the information content value produced by the
LSA, a comparison of each document within the random corpus to
the training corpus was conducted. This returned a document
proximity cosine value between each document in the random cor-
pus and every document in the training corpus.The histogram of
this data is shown in Fig. 2. This distribution returned a mean value
of X ¼ 0:1153 (skew = 0.527, kurtosis = 0.1254, sd = 0.0662). The
99th percentile of the random corpus cosine values was found to
be 0.292.
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training corpus was also conducted. This returned a document
proximity cosine value between each document in the query cor-
pus and every document in the training corpus. The histogram of
this data is shown in Fig. 2. This distribution returned a mean value
of X ¼ 0:0775 (skew = 2.257, kurtosis = 9.0276, sd = 0.0701).
To determine the improvement of the nearest neighbor match-
ing above chance, the primary-causes from the query corpus were
matched with a randomly selected cause from the training corpus.
Thus the distribution of the 18 cause categories (including a null
entry) found in the ASRS database was represented proportionally.
The resulting primary-cause accuracy match was determined to be
X ¼ 0:227. The posit that the primary-cause of a query will likely
be the primary-cause of the nearest neighbor found within the
training corpus was tested. This primary-cause matching tech-
nique returned an accuracy of X ¼ 0:449. Thus, the matching pre-
cision of the LSA approach was determined to be considerably
(22.2%) above that of chance.
Fig. 3 shows the distribution of nearest neighbor cosines from
the query corpus and the random corpus when compared to the
training corpus. The 99th percentile was found to occur at a cosine
value of 0.516 for the random corpus. This corresponded to the
same cosine value as the 26th percentile within the query corpus
distribution.5. Post hoc analysis
In the construction of this paper it became clear that two asser-
tions had been made without substantial foundation, either
through lack of rationale in the literature or directly by the authors.
Firstly, the selection of topic number for the LSA was based on
result accuracy. Hence, the choice of 400 topics was made after a
number of computational iterations, where topic number was plot-
ted against primary-cause matching accuracy. In the second
instance, the qualitative review process initially used was deter-
mined to lack sufﬁcient rigor to show that the cosine value provid-
ed a substantive measure of narrative similarity. These
shortcomings of the primary analysis were addressed as follows.5.1. Criterion for the selection of topics to retain
The number of semantic topics retained in the LSA process is
traditionally determined by heuristic processes. Since manyFig. 3. Histogram of document proximity cosine values for only the nearest
neighbors found within the training corpus when subjected to documents from the
query corpus and the random corpus.natural language processing problems attempt to recreate the
results of a human undertaking, validated samples of problems
and expected solutions exist. Therefore, processing techniques
can be tailored to a sample problem set before being subject to
an unseen challenge. When posed with the question of how many
topics to retain using the LSA technique, the common answer is to
measure the accuracy of the LSA output against a veriﬁed data set.
Thus, no internally consistent process is essential to obtain an ade-
quate result.
This outcome based approach fails to offer any logically ground-
ed framework for the application of results outside the study being
considered. When working with safety narratives, there are many
different taxonomies by which to categorize a report. Thus, the
LSA technique would likely result in different values of topic num-
ber for each different application even on the same data set.
In light of the inherent ambiguity in assignment of ‘cause’ from
a self-reported narrative, the need for an alternate criterion
became self evident. The key to development of a internal criterion
came from the creation of a random corpus and the comparison of
nearest neighbor cosine values. The summation of the cosine val-
ues of nearest neighbors describes the similarity of a given query
corpus to the training corpus. Where the summation is divided
by the number of queries, the outcome is an average of the nearest
neighbor cosine. The numerical comparison of the query corpus
average to the random corpus results in a measure of information
above that of chance. This measure of information complexity may
be maximized by manipulation of the number of topics retained.
Where the information complexity is maximized, the topics
retained may be considered ideal for the given training and query
corpora.
This process of maximizing information complexity of the LSA
was completed for the selected ASRS corpora. Fig. 4 demonstrates
that the greatest degree of complexity occurs at approximately 400
topics retained. Thus, this new approach was reconciled with the
initial outcome based selection of topic number.
5.2. Signiﬁcance of the LSA nearest neighbors
Evaluation of several LSA nearest neighbor pairs intuitively
indicated that reports of a similar nature were provided by LSA
nearest neighbor matches. In order to apply a more rigorous pro-
cess to assessing the similarity of LSA nearest neighbor pairs, post
hoc testing was done on a random sample of LSA nearest neighbor
pairings. 26 nearest neighbor pairings were identiﬁed throughFig. 4. Values of information complexity between random and query corpora for
different numbers of topics retained.
Fig. 6. Scatterplot of the nearest neighbor qualitative cosines of Researcher B
against cosine values for LSA.
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approximate threshold value of 0.50. Given that our interest was
primarily reports above the threshold value, ten nearest neighbor
pairs were selected at random from pairs above the threshold val-
ue. Three additional nearest neighbor pairs were randomly select-
ed for coding from pairs below the threshold value. The selected
collection of reports allows for the analysis of 287 non-nearest
neighbor pairings in addition to the 13 nearest neighbor pairs
selected.
To provide a systematic process for assessing the similarity of
the nearest neighbor reports, each report was coded using an open
coding process consistent with grounded theory (Glaser and
Strauss, 1967). One of the researchers conducted the open coding
of the reports, generating approximately 800 coding terms. These
coding terms were reduced through a focused coding process
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Charmaz, 2014) to develop a useable
taxonomy consisting of 162 coding terms. The results of this cod-
ing process were tabulated, with the results being used to generate
a 162 dimensional vector for each report. The vector was generated
for each report by taking a count of the number of times each cod-
ing concept appeared in the report, plotted in each associated
dimension. The resulting vectors from report pairs were compared
and consolidated into a single cosine value using a similar process
to that of the original LSA. To assess inter-relater reliability, a sec-
ond coder utilized the developed taxonomy to code each report
narrative, with a similar set of cosine values generated across each
report pair.
The cosine values resulting from the qualitative coding process
were compared with the LSA cosines for the same report pairings.
A scatterplot of these results in contained in Figs. 5 and 6. The
results (shown by Table 1) for researcher A indicate that there is
a large correlation (consistent with Cohen, 1992) between LSA
cosine and qualitative cosine values for all LSA nearest neighbor
values. The reported Pearson’s r values are, r = 0.615 for all reports,
r = 0.664 for reports above a cosine threshold value of 0.292, and
r = 0.897 for reports above a cosine threshold of 0.50. The results
for researcher B are less conclusive, indicating a medium effect
for the grouping of all reports (r = 0.438). The results for the 0.50
or 0.292 cosine thresholds were not statistically signiﬁcant. The
authors suspect that this lack of signiﬁcance at the 0.50 and
0.292 cosine values is due to poor inter-rater reliability in the cod-
ing process or low statistical power due to the limited sample size.
This suggests a need for further study involving a greater number
of coders and a larger dataset.Fig. 5. Scatterplot of the nearest neighbor qualitative cosines of Researcher A
against cosine values for LSA.In interpreting these results it is important to remain mindful of
the normality of each distribution. Since this dataset was generat-
ed from a relatively small set of coded reports randomly selected
based on nearest neighbor pairs, the cosine values between
non-nearest neighbor pairs are generally low. The result is a
positively skewed, leptokurtic distribution of cosine values for
the LSA and qualitatively coded reports. Descriptive statistics for
each set of cosine values is included in Table 2. The normality of
each distribution was veriﬁed using the Shapiro–Wilk test (Table 2)
which demonstrated that the 0.292 and 0.50 threshold distribu-
tions approached normal. The non-normality of the distributions
for all reports is of limited concern given that the correlation values
are generally robust to violations of the normality assumption and
are likely to result in reduced power rather than inﬂated sig-
niﬁcance (Glass et al., 1972; Edgell and Noon, 1984; Norman,
2010).
It is worth noting that researcher A and researcher B have
signiﬁcantly differing backgrounds that may have contributed to
differences in coding results. Researcher A is a former airline pilot
with several thousand hours experience and a background in
qualitative research methods. Researcher B is a trained air trafﬁc
controller with a background in quantitative research methods.
There is also the potential that language differences, unfamiliarity
with the coding taxonomy, and unclear instructions regarding the
coding process may have contributed to the differing results.
Overall, these results suggest that there is a correlation
between report similarity values generated from a qualitative
coding process with the cosine values generated by the LSA pro-
cess. This suggests that LSA is a useful tool for identifying ASRS
narrative reports possessing similar content, and that the LSA
process at least in part replicates the results of a qualitative cod-
ing process when searching for similar reports. The differences in
results between researcher A and researcher B are likely due to
differences in coding and the smaller n values at the 0.292 and
0.50 thresholds. It is suggested based on the results of this post
hoc testing that further study is needed to evaluate the consisten-
cy of LSA cosine values when compared to a qualitative coding
process. This study should utilize multiple qualitative coders,
with a normalized distribution of LSA cosine values, and a greater
number of reports above the associated cosine thresholds. This
post hoc evaluation further suggests that LSA has the potential
as a tool for evaluating the reliability of coders and taxonomies.
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The results presented here provide a proof of concept to the use
of machine learning in safety programs and research. Of the
research questions asked, all four were addressed successfully. This
outcomewas particularly surprising given the small training corpus
used and demonstrates the power of the LSA approach. Appendix A
provides empirical evidence and a substantial foundation for the
discussion and post hoc should therefore not be overlooked.
Does the use of LSA techniques reliably identify report narratives of
similar themes or context. An incident narrative is inherently a story
written in reﬂection by the person who lived that experience. As
with any story there is a beginning, middle, and end. Often there
is also a conclusion with suggestions as to how the individual or
organization is to avoid a similar issue. Therefore each narrative
forms a complex series of events. Review of Appendix A clearly
demonstrates the strong relationship between higher cosine value
and closer thematic similarity.
Can thematic similarity be used to predict causal similarity. The
moderate degree of primary-cause matching accuracy can be
closely associated with the small training corpus, when compared
with other LSA inquiries, used in this study. With LSA and other
machine learning techniques, an increase in data provided for
training results in improvements in accuracy. This is especially
true for LSA matching alone, where queries are compared to the
corpus used to train the LSA. Provided with the entire ASRS data-
base or a major air carrier ASAP database the accuracy would likely
increase substantially. Table 3 shows that the LSA matching
approach to causal prediction does not improve with increasing
cosine value. This result reﬂects the premise that incident cause
and thematic similarity are different.
What cosine values provide an appropriate threshold for identi-
fying thematic or contextual similarities between report narratives.Table 1
Paired correlation (Pearson’s r) statistics for nearest neighbor cosine values for LSA
when compared to researchers A and B for three cosine thresholds (all, 0.292, 0.50).
Comparison n Corr. sig.
All cosine values
LSA – Researcher A 300 0.62 0.00
LSA – Researcher B 300 0.44 0.00
Cosine values above 0.292
LSA – Researcher A 16 0.66 0.05
LSA – Researcher B 16 0.33 0.21
Cosine values above 0.50
LSA – Researcher A 10 0.90 0.00
LSA – Researcher B 10 0.286 0.42
Table 2
Descriptive statistics for nearest neighbor cosine values for LSA and researchers A and B f
n X sd Var Skew
val.
All cosine values
LSA 300 0.093 0.124 0.015 3.34
A 300 0.139 0.133 0.018 1.39
B 300 0.174 0.142 0.021 0.76
Cosine values above 0.292
LSA 16 0.554 0.129 0.017 0.08
A 16 0.373 0.166 0.028 0.21
B 16 0.345 0.152 0.023 0.10
Cosine values above 0.50
LSA 10 0.632 0.086 0.007 0.81
A 10 0.451 0.128 0.016 0.46
B 10 0.373 0.142 0.020 0.01
LSA represents the ﬁndings from latent semantic analysis, A those from researcher A, anThe 99th percentile value of the nearest neighbor cosine values
of the random corpus against a given training corpus may be
considered as a reasonable point to which contextual similarity
may be signiﬁcant. This cosine value for signiﬁcance as a sub-
jective measure will have to be determined by the researcher
based on their needs and from the corpora used in the inquiry.
It is important to caution that in the case of a nearest neigh-
bor, a small cosine value (close to zero or negative) returned
from the training corpus indicates uniqueness of the given
query. Such a query may be of higher importance to the
researcher.
Does the use of LSA techniques provide an additional tool that
may be reliably utilized in analyzing safety report narratives. Lit-
erature related to machine learning and safety taxonomies is
notably absent in aviation and other high consequence industries.
Where the LSA did not correctly match incident primary-cause,
an anecdotal review of the narratives was conducted by the
researchers. This survey provided evidence highlighting the
inherent limitations of the training corpus used in the LSA and
the ASRS taxonomy. Human coding is biased and prone to error
even for highly experienced coders (Wallace and Ross, 2004).
Documents may ﬁt into several categories. The ASRS taxonomy
was developed with a limited set of incidents that do not repre-
sent all categories that may signiﬁcantly affect safety. One sig-
niﬁcant example of a series of incidents with a serious effect
on safety but without a relevant category in the taxonomy was
related to food. Air crews during normal operations may ingest
food that, due to mislabeling or preparation, causes an allergic
or toxic reaction. The possible effect on crew members is sig-
niﬁcant and has the potential to cause an accident, yet such
events are coded with ‘Human Factors’ as the primary-cause
within the ASRS taxonomy. Appendix B shows the topics devel-
oped by the LSA.or three cosine thresholds (all, 0.292, 0.50).
ness Kurtosis Shapiro–Wilk
se val. se val. sig.
0.14 12.23 0.28 0.597 0.00
0.14 1.75 0.28 0.862 0.00
0.14 0.28 0.28 0.921 0.00
0.56 0.34 1.09 0.981 0.97
0.56 0.13 1.09 0.968 0.80
0.56 1.28 1.09 0.938 0.33
0.69 0.25 1.33 0.909 0.27
0.69 1.65 1.33 0.871 0.10
0.69 1.68 1.33 0.912 0.30
d B those from researcher B.
Table 3
Primary-cause match accuracy for the nearest neighbor found in the training corpus,
when ﬁrst ﬁltered for a minimum cosine value between documents in the LSA space.
Cosine threshold Cases found Match accuracy (%)
0.9 3 100
0.8 114 44.46
0.7 507 43.27
0.6 1318 46.17
0.5 2341 46.17
0.4 2916 45.13
0.3 2987 44.93
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LSA query ranking allows for ﬁltering and association of events
in a similar manner to the functionality offered by a taxonomy.
Since LSA is a machine-based approach human coding bias is
absent. Additionally with commonly accessible computing power,
rapid recoding and cross dataset comparison is possible. This pro-
cess may be applied to any area where narratives occur alongside
quantitative variables in large data sets, such as medicine, aviation,
and social work.
7. Conclusion
The relative success of this approach to coding of safety incident
narratives strongly suggests that further research in the applica-
tion of machine learning to safety management would be highly
productive. The LSA approach for event indexing and matching,
as well as a qualitative assessment tool has been clearly
demonstrated. This process highlights the inherent limitations of
taxonomies and provides a new mechanism for meeting the needs
of safety programs and researchers. This research highlights the
potential of LSA as a tool to address the shortfalls of both qualita-
tive and quantitative researchmethods in safety research. Provided
access to a larger narrative database, contextual comparisons could
be made across databases and disciplines.
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Appendix A. Narratives of interest
The following narratives were identiﬁed during anecdotal
review of the data. Events that appeared to ﬁt poorly into the tax-
onomy and those which had very close neighbors not of the same
code are provided for review. Narrative numbers with the letter ‘Q’
following the index are taken from the query corpus. Those narra-
tives taken from the training corpus are numbered without follow-
ing characters.
Narratives 1388 (ACN 962540) and 1282 (ACN 959858). Respec-
tive primary-causes: ‘Human Factors’ and ‘Human Factors’.
. . .At approximately 2 h into ﬂight we both had our crew meals.
The First Ofﬁcer had the Ravioli; and I had the Teriyaki Steak din-
ner. Within 15 min of eating the meal; I started experiencing the
onset of an allergic reaction. My eyes began to itch; my nose
started to run; andmyhands began to itch. The rate atwhich the-
se symptoms appeared was familiar to me as I am severely aller-
gic to certain food items (peanuts; pine nuts; sesame seeds;
pumpkin seeds; etc.). Within 30 min of eating the crew meal;
my tongue had swollen to the pointwhere Iwas not able to speak
understandably; my eyes had swollen to the point where my
vision was signiﬁcantly restricted; my breathing was labored.
. . .I also retrieved my Epi-Pen from my suitcase. I instructed
the jump-seater on how to administer the Epi-Pen ‘just in case.’
. . .Post amemoalertingﬂight crews about thepossibility of being
served crew meals that may cause allergic reactions.
Cosine between this narrative and the following one was 0.535,
which within the LSA document space represents a weak asso-
ciation, however this was the strongest available with the corpus
and the documents were coded similarly.
I was the Captain and pilot not ﬂying (PNF) for this leg. Prior to
departure I had the very; very slightest onset of a sensation ofvertigo. I was able to walk normally and there was no impair-
ment to my ability to function as a pilot. After takeoff; the ver-
tigo escalated at a truly amazing rate. After some twenty
minutes; I handed off the PNF duties to the First Ofﬁcer thinking
that I was incurring some form of food poisoning. At a certain
point; the vertigo was so extreme that when I went to stow
my headset to my immediate left; I was ‘thrown’ hard to the
left. My vision became jittery owing to the inner ear/vision con-
ﬂict. I was soon using oxygen with my forehead braced against
the glare shield. The sensation of vertigo was now extreme; like
the worst ride in a vertigo trainer times ﬁve. Approximately an
hour and a half from destination; I declared myself incapacitat-
ed. Utilizing the help of my number one Flight Attendant; I was
able to shift from the left seat to the right jump seat. I then sum-
moned a B767 First Ofﬁcer who was in the cabin as a passenger
and installed him in the left seat. I made a few constructive
suggestions to the crew and let them proceed. A medical emer-
gency was declared at some point. I urged the crew to proceed
to destination as other than the vertigo; I had no other symp-
toms. On descent; I incurred rather violent vomiting. Utilizing
my Captain’s authority; I admitted a nurse to the ﬂight deck.
She took my vitals and administered a cold compress to my
neck; which helped alleviate the discomfort an appreciable
amount. The nurse then left the cockpit. I urged the crew to
coordinate a tow-in at the gate in the interests of safety.
Although the tug was not waiting; little time was lost getting
us to the gate and paramedics removed me from the ﬂight deck.
Several points come to mind looking back on this event. First;
never having experienced vertigo; I had no idea a medical event
like the one I experienced could occur. Had I even the slightest
idea; we would not have departed. I might have declared myself
incapacitated earlier than I did. I don’t believe anything bad
became of it; but the crew would have had perhaps thirty more
minutes to organize themselves. As it was; they did very well
with the time (approximately 1 h 20 min) allotted to them.
The role of the number one Flight Attendant cannot be under-
stated. He was instrumental in getting me out of the left seat
and into the jump seat; summoning medical help; providing a
walk-around bottle; etc. Good CRM of the entire crew was para-
mount to the positive outcome of this event.
Narrative 4000 (ACN 1044952) and 3879 (ACN 1040480). Respec-
tive primary-causes: ‘Human Factors’ and ‘Aircraft’.
The First Ofﬁcer lifted his backpack which was on the ﬂoor
behind his seat. His bag strap caught onto the DC Standby Bus
CB and there was a momentary power interruption in the DC
standby bus. The subsequent result in the power interruption
was the loss of the L ENG EEC normal mode. Per checklist and
conference with Maintenance; both engines were placed in
the EEC ALT MODE resulting in the loss of the autothrottles.
Flight continued and landed with no further problems.
Cosine between this narrative and the following one was 0.593,
which within the LSA document space represents a weak asso-
ciation, however this was the strongest available with the corpus
and the documents were coded appropriately with a very different
primary-cause.
The preﬂight Standby Power Test passed (no Bus ‘Off’ light) but
generated a Standby Inverter Status message. The Status mes-
sage could be erased; but it returned when the Standby Power
Test was repeated. A check of the electrical EICAS Maintenance
page showed no volts or frequencies on the Standby AC Bus dur-
ing the test. In addition; components listed in the Flight Manual
as being powered by the Standby AC Bus were unpowered dur-
ing the test (e.g. the Captain’s ﬂight instruments all had ﬂags
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bad Standby Inverter. It was replaced and everything worked
normally. Here’s the problem. Why did we not get a Bus ‘Off’
light or a Standby Bus ‘Off’ EICAS advisory during the test?
The Flight Manual lists the components that are powered by
the Standby AC Bus. One of these components is the Standby
AC Bus ‘Off’ indication. This implies that the sensor to tell you
the Standby AC Bus has no power is actually powered by that
very same bus. If true; this means the warning will never work
because it has no power. How ironic. The Flight Manual lists the
same thing for the Standby DC Bus. If the plane is really wired
this way; then looking for a bus off light or EICAS advisory dur-
ing the Standby Power Test has no validity whatsoever. Our pro-
cedures regarding status messages during preﬂight allow us to
press on if we can erase the status message. In this case; that
would have led to us departing with an inoperative Standby
Inverter. Perhaps some status messages need a little more
scrutiny; but unfortunately pilots are given very little informa-
tion about the meanings of status messages. A table in the ﬂight
manual listing all status messages and their meanings would be
quite helpful.
Narratives 3667 (ACN 1031966) and 1697 (ACN 969496). Respec-
tive primary-causes: ‘Ambiguous’ and ‘Aircraft’.
Ready for pushback; Flight Attendant from door 2L came to
cockpit to indicate that door 2L was not arming properly; that
the wedge was not coming out. [I] went to door 2L to investi-
gate. Looking at door; moved lever to disarm and looked again.
Opened door handle and it was apparent that door was not dis-
armed; door with assist opened partially. Slide was attached at
bottom and partly out of pack. I tried to close door but slide
then deployed. No one was hurt; no one else was involved in
manipulating the door. Maintenance was called and it was
determined that the slide would be replaced and ﬂight to oper-
ate with a delay.
Cosine between this narrative and the following one was 0.862,
which within the LSA document space represents a strong asso-
ciation, however the primary-causes were coded differently.
This was a charter ﬂight. The aircraft was parked in the north
lot. Airstairs were brought to the aircraft door at 1L. It appeared
the person trying to open the door was having difﬁculty open-
ing the door. I cracked the door. He still appeared to be having
difﬁculty; so I gave the door a push. The person on the other
side was still having difﬁculty opening the door. I soon saw
why. The side of the slide pan was caught on the side of the air-
craft door. As the person on the outside continued to pull the
door open the slide pan opened and the slide fell out; but did
not deploy. A Mechanic arrived to detach the slide from the
door. He said the door was armed. The arming mechanism
was stuck between arm and disarm and we were unable to
put it in either the arm or the disarm position. I told him that
I disarmed the door. After I disarmed it; I made the all call to
disarm cross check and stand by for all call. As I made the all call
I ﬁrst made the announcement; ‘1L and 1R disarmed and cross
checked.’ As I made the announcement I double checked each
door. Then ﬂight attendants at doors two and four conﬁrmed
their doors were disarmed and cross checked. This is my ﬁrst
charter ﬂight and no one has made it clear who opens doors
at what station. There should be some clarity here. While we
were at this airport; those who met the ﬂight waited to open
the door. Then I was told (can’t remember if it was the Cus-
tomer Service Representative or the GSC) that I had to open
the door. The GSC and the Customer Service Coordinator were
both in the galley when the incident occurred. Both said theysaw me disarm the door. This past week while on a B757 after
the passengers deplaned; a Mechanic came to door 2L with a
screwdriver and he began pushing in the rubber tubing sur-
rounding the door. Curious; I asked why he was doing that.
He said he likes to double check. I asked if the slide pan could
get caught on the door. He reluctantly said; ‘It could.’ My guess
is this is an issue that has not occurred for the ﬁrst time. I hope
there will be a check on B757’s to make sure this does not hap-
pen again in the future. It is possible the next time a slide may
in fact deploy.
Narratives 83Q (ACN 819565) and 2602 (ACN 991859). These
documents were found by analysis of the cases that did not match
following selection of cases with cosine values above 0.80. Respec-
tive primary-causes: ‘Ambiguous’ and ‘Airport’.
Cleared to taxi via Taxiway C to Runway 22R. Turned left on
Taxiway E instead of Taxiway ZA. Signage is not clear. The sign
indicating an intersection turn to Runway 22R strongly suggests
that the left turn should be at Taxiway E. Suggest a sign indicat-
ing that Taxiway E is the route to Runway 22L and marking the
pavement. There were no conﬂicts and the somewhat longer
taxi to Runway 22R was uneventful.
Cosine between this narrative and the following one was 0.892,
which within the LSA document space represents a very strong
association, however the primary-causes were coded differently.
The CHS airport taxiway signs at the Taxiway B and Taxiway C
intersection are inadequate and/or missing. While moving
southwest on Taxiway C toward Taxiway B; the only sign
depicting the Taxiway B turn is placed past the Taxiway C/
Taxiway B intersection. This placement past the intersection is
nonstandard. The Taxiway B turn sign should be placed before
the Taxiway C/Taxiway B intersection for standardization.
While moving north on the ramp from the gates toward Taxi-
way B; there are no signs identifying Taxiway B. There should
be a sign that identiﬁes Taxiway B as the jet approaches Taxi-
way B from the ramp. I am not sure if Taxiway A is identiﬁed
with a sign or not. We did not take that route out of the ramp
area. While moving north on Taxiway B (unidentiﬁed taxiway)
toward Taxiway C there is no Taxiway C turn sign (either direc-
tion). However; there is a good sign at the Taxiway B and
Taxiway C intersection; which has an arrow pointing left
toward Runway 3 and an arrow pointing right toward Runway
33. While moving northeast on Taxiway C toward Taxiway B;
there are no signs identifying Taxiway B. There should be a
Taxiway B turn sign along Taxiway C (northeast) located before
the Taxiway B turn. Thanks for looking into the CHS taxi signs.
Narratives 901Q (ACN 836772) and 3812 (ACN 1037700). These
documents were found by analysis of the cases that did not match
following selection of cases with cosine values above 0.80. Respec-
tive primary-causes: ‘Human Factors’ and ‘Chart Or Publication’.
After the ground crew pushed us back from gate the aircraft was
blocking the gate next to ours. An air carrier was going into that
gate so we offered to move forward to accommodate them.
Ramp control gave us taxi instructions to pull straight forward
and taxi to Spot 3. After verifying where Spot 3 was; the Captain
started to taxi. It appeared that the only way to get to Spot 3
was to taxi onto Kilo. The Captain and I ﬁgured that Spot 3
was on Kilo. However; when we got onto Kilo I called ground
and told them we were on Kilo and that was when they told
us that we were in violation of the FARS. The event occurred
because the Captain and I were under the impression that ramp
control wanted us to taxi down to the Spot 3 near the de-icing
pad. Which is the de-icing pad Spot 3 not the Spot 3 where they
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mercial chart north ramp page that the Spot 3 we should have
been going to was right on Echo. I think Spots 3; 4; 5; 6; should
be depicted on the DTW airport chart instead of just being on
the DTW north ramp page. The lines on Echo need to be painted
better. The taxi instructions need to be more speciﬁc.
Cosine between this narrative and the following one was 0.853,
which within the LSA document space represents a very strong
association, however the primary-causes were coded differently.
We were told by LAS Ramp Controller to taxi to Spot 7. When I
looked at the Commercial chart for Concourse D; I located spot
seven and began a taxi to what I thought was that spot. As I
arrived at the spot it was in fact spot 8. If you look at the chart
you will see spot 8; not next to spot seven (where in fact it is)
but half way down the chart. When I tried to call ramp to inform
them of my mistake I noticed the First Ofﬁcer had already
switched to Ground and we then received a runway change
and amendment to our clearance. I continued the taxi as I felt
this was the safest course of action.
Narratives 902Q (ACN 836773) and 338 (ACN 935283). These
documents were found by analysis of the cases that did not match
following selection of cases with cosine values above 0.80. Respec-
tive primary-causes: ‘Procedure’ and ‘Aircraft’.
’We made a precautionary return to departure airport due to
low oil quantity. Upon preﬂight inspection of the aircraft; we
noticed the quantity was 8 quarts in the left engine and 9 quarts
in the right. Captain called maintenance to see if we could get
some oil added and they advised the quantity was sufﬁcient
to make it to destination. Shortly after takeoff; we noticed 2
quarts displayed in the left and 1 quart in the right. We leveled
off according to procedure; reduced the power and advised the
tower of a possible return. The left engine was now displaying 1
quart (matching the right) and after 30 s; we decided to return
to the ﬁeld. Our landing weight was under gross and we had
normal indications for oil temperature and pressure. Upon
return to the gate; the Captain called company and mainte-
nance arrived; adding 9 quarts of oil to the left engine and 8
quarts to the right. The aircraft landed the previous evening
with 6 quarts of oil in the left engine and 7 in the right. Had
oil been added; this event would not have occurred.
Cosine between this narrative and the following one was 0.869,
which within the LSA document space represents a very strong
association, however the primary-causes were coded differently.
Our layover was extended due to the fact that the inbound air-
craft had an in ﬂight engine shutdown due to low oil quantity
and low oil pressure. Mechanics were ﬂown into work on the
aircraft overnight. We were told the aircraft would be ready
the following morning and we would ﬂy the aircraft out. During
the preﬂight we noted that both engines had 22 quarts of oil.
We had normal takeoff and climb to FL350. During the initial
cruise portion of the ﬂight we noted that both engine oil quan-
tities had stabilized at about 12 quarts. As the ﬂight progressed
we noticed the right engine oil quantity beginning to decrease.
It slowly went from 12 to 10 to 9 to 8 to 6 quarts. At this point
the Captain and I became concerned about the oil loss and
decided the safest action would be to return to the departure
airport. The communications with Dispatch and Maintenance
Control were very difﬁcult through commercial radio. We end-
ed up relaying most of our information through a company
ﬂight that could use their ACARS. As we returned to the airport
the oil quantity in the right engine continued to decrease to 4
quarts. We had all available checklists out and were preparedfor an engine shutdown if necessary. We did not declare and
emergency and discussed continuing to another airport for pas-
senger convenience. As the oil quantity continued to decrease
we decided our departure airport would be a better decision.
The right engine oil pressure and temperature remained steady
and we did not shut down an engine. We had an uneventful
approach and landing into our departure airport. After landing
and shutdown we noted the right engine had 13 quarts of oil
remaining. In the course of about two and a half hours of ﬂight
we had lost over 9 quarts of oil. We had a Company engine spe-
cialist on our ﬂight. He told us that this engine had a long his-
tory of problems with it. I don’t feel the proper maintenance
was done on this engine. Also communication with Dispatch
and Maintenance were very difﬁcult; almost impossible via
HF phone patch. We were then instructed to deadhead home
on the next ﬂight.
Narratives 1082Q (ACN 839745) and 3667 (ACN 1031966). These
documents were found by analysis of the cases that did not match
following selection of cases with cosine values above 0.80. Respec-
tive primary-causes: ‘Human Factors’ and ‘Ambiguous’.
After arrival at gate; the Flight Attendant disarmed door 2R and
then proceeded to door 2L where he began opening the door
without disarming it. Realizing his mistake; he attempted to
disarm the door; but the gate agent outside the door began try-
ing to open the door resisting the ﬂight attendants attempt to
close and disarm the door. The slide pack fell onto the cabin
ﬂoor but did not inﬂate. Company personnel were summoned
and took control of the situation. As Captain; I was still in the
cockpit ﬁnishing the last of my cleanup procedures and was
unaware of the events as no one notiﬁed me. I became aware
of the situation only when going to the door 2L area where I
became aware of what was going on.
Cosine between this narrative and the following one was
0.862, which within the LSA document space represents a very
strong association, however the primary-causes were coded
differently.
Ready for pushback; Flight Attendant from door 2L came to
cockpit to indicate that door 2L was not arming properly; that
the wedge was not coming out. [I] went to door 2L to investi-
gate. Looking at door; moved lever to disarm and looked again.
Opened door handle and it was apparent that door was not dis-
armed; door with assist opened partially. Slide was attached at
bottom and partly out of pack. I tried to close door but slide
then deployed. No one was hurt; no one else was involved in
manipulating the door. Maintenance was called and it was
determined that the slide would be replaced and ﬂight to oper-
ate with a delay.Appendix B. Topics generated by the analysis
Table B.4 shows the terms and weights for the ﬁrst four (of 400)
topics developed by the LSA. Topic 1 contains many common
terms, but is strongly associated with takeoff and landing events
in the context of mechanical issues. This is the most generic topic
within the document corpus. Topic 2 unlike topic 1 demonstrates
negative weightings for terms within the topic. Terms with nega-
tive weightings are those which are penalized when present in a
document. Thus the negatively weighted terms ‘engine’ and ‘gear’
suggest that topic 2 is not associated with mechanical issues,
rather with approach and clearance problems. Topic 3 highlights
issues with conﬁguration during approach and landing. Topic 4
represents higher altitude events since terms that represent low
Table B.4
LSA topics produced in the reduced semantic space for the ASRS narratives database sample.
Topic
1 2 3 4
Weight Term Weight Term Weight Term Weight Term
0.142 engine 0.256 engine 0.306 gear 0.464 gear
0.126 runway 0.177 trafﬁc 0.217 ﬂaps 0.256 ﬂ
0.122 approach 0.169 ft 0.188 approach 0.227 engine
0.116 captain 0.162 gear 0.172 ft 0.216 cabin
0.115 ft 0.153 controller 0.164 door 0.188 runway
0.111 landing 0.145 clearance 0.141 qrh 0.168 altitude
0.108 gear 0.136 approach 0.140 landing 0.158 descent
0.106 us 0.132 carrier 0.139 ﬂap 0.149 ft
0.101 maintenance 0.129 ﬁre 0.130 carrier 0.148 oil
0.095 atc 0.128 runway 0.126 air 0.147 tower
– – – – – – – –
S.D. Robinson et al. / Safety Science 75 (2015) 118–129 129altitude are negatively weighted. Positively weighted are terms
associated with mechanical issues such as engine and pack failures.
Appendix C. Stop words used to ﬁlter the dictionary
‘i’, ‘me’, ‘my’, ‘myself’, ‘we’, ‘our’, ‘ours’, ‘ourselves’, ‘you’, ‘your’,
‘yours’, ‘yourself’, ‘yourselves’, ‘he’, ‘him’, ‘his’, ‘himself’, ‘she’, ‘her’,
‘hers’, ‘herself’, ‘it’, ‘its’, ‘itself’, ‘they’, ‘them’, ‘their’, ‘theirs’, ‘them-
selves’, ‘what’, ‘which’, ‘who’, ‘whom’, ‘this’, ‘that’, ‘these’, ‘those’,
‘am’, ‘is’, ‘are’, ‘was’, ‘were’, ‘be’, ‘been’, ‘being’, ‘have’, ‘has’, ‘had’,
‘having’, ‘do’, ‘does’, ‘did’, ‘doing’, ‘a’, ‘an’, ‘the’, ‘and’, ‘but’, ‘if’, ‘or’,
‘because’, ‘as’, ‘until’, ‘while’, ‘of’, ‘at’, ‘by’, ‘for’, ‘with’, ‘about’, ‘a-
gainst’, ‘between’, ‘into’, ‘through’, ‘during’, ‘before’, ‘after’, ‘above’,
‘below’, ‘to’, ‘from’, ‘up’, ‘down’, ‘in’, ‘out’, ‘on’, ‘off’, ‘over’, ‘under’,
‘again’, ‘further’, ‘then’, ‘once’, ‘here’, ‘there’, ‘when’, ‘where’,
‘why’, ‘how’, ‘all’, ‘any’, ‘both’, ‘each’, ‘few’, ‘more’, ‘most’, ‘other’,
‘some’, ‘such’, ‘no’, ‘nor’, ‘not’, ‘only’, ‘own’, ‘same’, ‘so’, ‘than’,
‘too’, ‘very’, ‘s’, ‘t’, ‘can’, ‘will’, ‘just’, ‘don’, ‘should’, ‘now’.
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